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*1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
The petition for a writ of mandamus should be denied because the proceedings in the state 
courts on remand, though not yet complete, are fully in accord with this Court's mandate, and 
petitioner has shown no grounds for this extraordinary relief. In its opinion in this case on June 
23, 2003, this Court held that the permissibility of class-wide arbitration is a matter of case-by-
case, state-law contract interpretation for the arbitrator to decide. Pet. App. 8a-11a. Because 
four of the six justices in this Court's majority thought that “what happened in arbitration” on 
that question of contract interpretation was not entirely “clear,” the Court remanded for further 
proceedings. Pet. App. 11a. The plurality acknowledged that the arbitrator might already have 
independently determined that Green Tree's arbitration clause permitted class arbitration, 
quoting the arbitrator's own order *2 in which he said “ I determined that a class action should 
proceed in arbitration based on my careful review of the broadly drafted arbitration clause 
prepared by Green Tree.” Pet. App. 12a. A state trial court had earlier read the clause the same 
way, however, and this Court had not previously delineated arbitrators' and courts' respective 
roles in deciding such questions. Accordingly, because the “record suggest[ed]” that “the 
arbitrator's decision reflected a court's interpretation of the contracts rather than an arbitrator's 
decision,” this Court decided to “remand the case so that this question may be resolved in 
arbitration.” Pet. App. 6a, 12a. 
In response to this Court's order vacating the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court 
and remanding for further proceedings, the state high court remanded to the arbitrator (a former 
state court circuit judge), who has now unmistakably confirmed in a written order that he did, in 
the first instance, independently interpret the contract to permit class arbitration, and that he 
continues to adhere to that view. Id. at 3a, 20a-22a. The procedure and substance of the state 
courts' and the arbitrator's actions are fully consistent with this Court's mandate. Contrary to 
petitioner's contentions, this Court did not hold that the arbitration awards violated the FAA. 
Moreover, FAA §§ 9 and 10 do not apply, and do not require an approach different from that 
which the state courts and arbitrator have thus far pursued under the mandate. 
Respondents won their judgments twenty-seven months before Green Tree filed for bankruptcy 
protection, and petitioner was required to post bonds to secure them. Petitioner (now a 
liquidating trust in bankruptcy known as the CFC Estate) long ago exhausted its challenges to the 
merits of the arbitrator's decision that the company wilfully and egregiously violated the 
statutory rights of over 3,600 South Carolina consumers. Petitioner is nonetheless waging an 
aggressive campaign, repeatedly (and thus far unsuccessfully) seeking on procedural grounds in 
various fora to vacate the *3 state court judgments, release the bonds, recover the collateral, 
and convert respondents from secured to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy to minimize their 
recovery on the judgments. This petition is but the latest effort to achieve vacatur of the state 
trial court's judgments confirming the arbitration awards, in order that petitioner might then 
attempt to argue for release of the bonds securing those judgments and eviscerate respondents' 
recovery. The South Carolina Supreme Court, following full briefing, correctly applied state 
procedural law to deny petitioner's motion to vacate the underlying judgments. Pet. App. 1a-4a. 
The current petition invites this Court to second-guess and micro-manage the state courts' 
procedures for remitting this case to the arbitrator, and should be denied. 
 
Background 
 
Pre-mandate State Court Proceedings. This case originnated as two separate actions against 
Green Tree Financial Corporation in the South Carolina State Circuit Courts. ( Bazzle v. Green 
Tree, C/A No. 97-CP-18-258, and Lackey v. Green Tree, C/A No.96-CP-06-073). In 2000, the 
Bazzle/Lackey plaintiffs (respondents here) obtained two separate judgments against Green 
Tree. Each judgment confirmed an award by the same arbitrator, who found that Green Tree had 
willfully violated the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code. 
Green Tree appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court assumed immediate jurisdiction. As 
a condition of obtaining a stay pending appeal, Green Tree in December 2000 and June 2001 
obtained state trial courts' approval of supersedeas bonds securing the judgments. On August 
26, 2002, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, ruling that the arbitrator 
had authority to arbitrate the Bazzle/Lackey actions on a class-wide basis. In early November 
2002, each of the trial courts granted Green Tree's *4 motion to stay enforcement of the 
judgments, expressly conditioning the stay on Green Tree making timely deposits of post-
judgment interest that continued to accrue in the interim. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., No. 
00-CP-18-793, slip. op. (Nov. 6, 2002) (order of state circuit court awarding interim interest), 
Opp. App. 2a; and Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 96-CP-06-073, slip op. (Nov. 6, 2002)(order 
of circuit court awarding interim interest), Opp. App. 5a. 
Pre-mandate Bankruptcy Court Proceedings. On December 17, 2002, Conseco Finance, 
formerly known as Green Tree, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The pendency of bankruptcy proceedings 
automatically stayed all litigation by or against Green Tree. On January 21, 2003, after petitioner 
had already filed its petition for certiorari in this Court, petitioner obtained an order from the 
bankruptcy court providing that “the automatic stay is hereby annulled retroactively to the 
Petition Date for the limited purpose of prosecuting the Supreme Court Action ….” In re Conseco, 
Inc., No. 02 B 49672, slip. op. at 2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2003) (order lifting automatic stay). 
This Court's Decision and the Mandate. This Court granted certiorari on the question 
“[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (FAA), prohibits class-action 
procedures from being superimposed onto an arbitration agreement that does not provide for 
class-action arbitration.” 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2404 (2003). In its June 23, 2003 opinion, this Court 
rejected petitioner Green Tree's contention that class-wide arbitration under a predispute 
arbitration clause not expressly authorizing class proceedings violates the FAA, instead holding 
that the permissibility of class-wide arbitration is a matter of case-by-case, state-law contract 
interpretation for the arbitrator to decide. Pet. App. 11a-12a (plurality opinion); id. at 13a 
(Stevens, J., concurring *5 in the judgment); id. at 19a (Thomas, J, dissenting in favor of 
outright affirmance). 
This Court recognized that the arbitration clause might correctly be read to permit class 
arbitration.[FN1] The opinion also expressly acknowledged the possibility that the arbitrator had 
already independently read the arbitration clause to authorize him to proceed on a class basis, 
noting that the arbitrator stated that he based his award on “ my careful review of the broadly 
drafted arbitration clause prepared by Green Tree.” Pet. App. 12a.[FN2] The Court also saw reason 
for some uncertainty as to what had occurred. Pet. App. 6a (noting that the “record suggests” 
that the arbitrator may not yet have made an independent decision), id. at 11a (observing that 
“what happened in arbitration” was not “clear”). Until this Court decided this case, the law was 
undeveloped as to whether the permissibility of class arbitration is ordinarily a *6 matter for 
courts or arbitrators to decide. The Court expressed concern that the arbitrator, who interpreted 
the clause to permit class arbitration after a state trial court had already read the clause the 
same way, might not have appreciated that the decision was his to make in the first instance. 
Pet. App. 12a. Because four of the six justices in the majority thought that “what happened in 
arbitration” on the contract interpretation question was unclear, the Court remanded for further 
proceedings to clarify the arbitrators' decision. Pet. App. 9a, 11a.[FN3] 
FN1. Green Tree argued that the clause's reference to resolution of disputes “by one arbitrator 
selected by us [Green Tree] with consent of you [Green Tree's customer]” foreclosed class 
arbitration, but this Court observed that “[t]he class arbitrator was ‘selected by’ Green Tree ‘with 
consent of’ Green Tree's customers, the named plaintiffs. And insofar as the other class 
members agreed to proceed in class arbitration, they consented as well.” Pet. App. 9a. 
FN2. Indeed, Green Tree's own original briefs to the South Carolina Supreme Court, in advance 
of this Court's decision, repeatedly asserted that the arbitrator was the one who had interpreted 
the contract. Green Tree asserted that the arbitrator “ took it upon himself to determine the 
propriety of a class-wide arbitration and certify a class” Final Brief of Appellant, at 29, Bazzle v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., Case No. 00-CP-18-443 (S.C. filed December 6, 2001), that “the 
arbitrator, on his own, imposed class-wide arbitration and certified a class” Final Brief of 
Appellant, at 12, Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., Case No. 00-CP-18-443 (S.C. filed December 
6, 2001), and that the arbitrator “decided the class action issue himself.” Final Brief of Appellant, 
at 2, Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., Case No. 00-CP-18-443 (S.C. filed December 6, 2001) 
(emphases added). 
FN3. Justice Thomas concluded that the FAA simply does not apply to proceedings in state 
courts, and thus lacks any preemptive force here. Pet. App. 19a (Thomas, J, dissenting). He 
“would leave undisturbed the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.” Id. Justice 
Stevens also saw no need to remand, “because the decision to conduct a class arbitration was 
correct as a matter of law, and because petitioner has merely challenged the merits of that 
decision without claiming that it was made by the wrong decisionmaker.” Id. at 13a (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens “would simply affirm the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina,” but concurred in the judgment to remand in order to avoid a decision 
lacking a controlling judgment. Id. 
This Court's mandate directed that “the judgment of the above court in this cause [the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina] is vacated with costs, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.” Green 
Tree v. Bazzle, Case No. 02-634 (Aug. 6, 2003) (Mandate of this Court). Neither the mandate 
nor this Court's opinion makes any reference to or purports to disturb the underlying arbitration 
awards or trial court judgments confirming those awards. 
Post-mandate State Court Proceedings. In response to the United States Supreme Court's 
mandate, on August 6, 2003, the South Carolina Supreme Court sua sponte returned this matter 
to the arbitrator “for further proceedings not *7 inconsistent with the opinion of that Court.”[FN4] 
Letter from Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court, to Thomas Ervin, at 1 (Aug. 6, 2003), 
Opp. App. 9a. On August 12, 2003, the arbitrator addressed the question of contract 
interpretation in an order that provides, in relevant part: 
FN4. On August 8, 2003, Green Tree for the first time notified the South Carolina Supreme Court 
of its filing for bankruptcy by filing with the court a suggestion of bankruptcy. Green Tree did not 
file any similar motion before the arbitrator. 
I wish to clarify my prior rulings that the arbitration clause contained in these adhesion contracts 
written by Green Tree were silent as to class certification in arbitration …. I applied South 
Carolina contract law in construing this broad arbitration clause drafted by Green Tree. I 
concluded that since the arbitration clause was silent as to class treatment that class certification 
was appropriate. I reached this decision independently in arbitration without influence from any 
other court ruling. My orders in these arbitrations were based solely upon my own independent 
interpretation of Green Tree's consumer contracts and my own independent construction and 
application of South Carolina contract law. For clarification only, I issue this Order nunc pro tunc, 
retroactive to my initial Order in Arbitration. 
Opp. App. 7a-8a. 
On August 13, 2003, the bankruptcy court ruled that its prior Order lifting the stay to permit this 
Court's review did not allow action on remand pursuant to this Court's mandate. The bankruptcy 
court thus held that the arbitrator's August 12, 2003, order was void because it violated the 
automatic stay. Thereafter, the Bazzle/Lackey plaintiffs successfully moved the bankruptcy court 
to permit them to proceed in state court and before the arbitrator to carry out this Court's 
remand order. 
*8 On December 18, 2003, petitioner moved the South Carolina Supreme Court to vacate the 
trial court judgments before permitting the arbitrator to proceed. See Pet. App. 3a. Following full 
briefing on state-law procedures for sending the contract question to the arbitrator, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court denied Green Tree's motion, and ordered the matter be “remanded to 
arbitrator Thomas Ervin to determine whether class arbitration was permissible under the 
parties' contract.” Pet. App. 3a. 
At petitioner's request, the arbitrator held a conference with the parties on February 27, 2004. At 
the close of that proceeding, the arbitrator announced his decision and memorialized it in a 
written Supplemental Order, which, in pertinent part, provides: 
[t]he question of whether the subject arbitration clauses allowed for class arbitration has already 
been fully briefed and argued by the parties in the proceedings before me. I initially addressed 
the question of contract interpretation in the Lackey case, and held that Green Tree's arbitration 
agreement authorized class arbitration. I received briefs from the parties, and held a hearing on 
August 19, 1998, specifically to determine “whether or not a class action could be arbitrated 
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement between the parties.” Order dated August 29, 1998. As I 
explained in my final written award, “I determined that a class action should proceed in 
arbitration based upon my careful review of the broadly drafted arbitration clause prepared by 
Green Tree.” Final Order and Award in Arbitration, July 24, 2000, quoted in Green Tree v. Bazzle, 
[539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct.] at 2408. In reaching my decision, I relied on the terms of the 
arbitration agreement. I did not consider myself bound by the trial court's earlier class 
certification order in Bazzle. The parties did not argue, nor did I believe, that my determination 
of the question should be anything other than my own de novo decision. I only viewed the earlier 
Bazzle court order as persuasive *9 -not binding-authority that supported my own reading of the 
contract language. It was then, and remains now, my independent construction that the 
agreement must be read to permit class arbitration. 
My determination in Lackey that the agreement authorized class arbitration applies with equal 
force in Bazzle. Moreover, I was required on several occasions to directly consider the class 
arbitration issue in the Bazzle matter. The first instance was when Green Tree moved to dismiss 
and decertify the class in Bazzle. My denial of that motion implicitly reaffirmed my earlier 
construction of the arbitration clause. The second instance was when the Bazzle Complaint was 
amended in arbitration at the request of Green Tree. The Amended Complaint asserted class 
allegations without objecttion from Green Tree. Green Tree also requested that the Lackey home 
improvement transactions be moved to and consolidated in the Bazzle arbitration proceedings. 
These events necessitated my independent determination that it was appropriate to proceed as a 
class action in the Bazzle matter. 
Pet. App. 20a-22a. The arbitrator transmitted the Supplemental Order to the South Carolina 
Supreme Court. On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed its writ of mandamus with this Court. 
Post-mandate Bankruptcy Proceedings. Meanwhile, when this case was on remand to the 
state courts, petitioner on August 13, 2003, initiated an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy 
court seeking a declaration that the obligations under the supersedeas bonds had been 
discharged by this Court's decision. Petitioner had long before sold its interests in the collateral 
securing the supersedeas bonds.[FN5] The *10 bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary action, 
abstaining in favor of a state court decision on the status of the bonds. On September 9, 2003, 
the bankruptcy court held its final confirmation hearing and entered an order confirming the 
liquidation plan. On December 18, 2003, that court granted leave to proceed in the South 
Carolina courts in the underlying actions. Those proceedings progressed, as described above, but 
are not yet complete. 
FN5. Petitioner acknowledged that “[t]he cash collateralizing the Supersedeas Bonds and on 
bond with the South Carolina courts has been sold to CFN as part of the CFN Sale Transaction. 
Thus, to the extent that any such cash is released, it will not become property of Conseco's 
estates, if it ever was.” Debtor's Obj. to Emerg. Mot. for Order Clarifying Automatic Stay, at 5 n. 
2, In re Conseco, Inc., No. 02 B 49672 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed July 9, 2003) 
 
REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
 
This Court directed that this case be remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court for further 
proceedings. The South Carolina Supreme Court then submitted the matter to the arbitrator for 
clarification as to whether he arrived at his interpretation of the arbitration clause independently, 
or whether the arbitrator actually disagreed with the state trial court but erroneously believed 
that he was bound by that court's view that the arbitration clause permitted class proceedings. 
The arbitrator has now made unmistakably clear that it was, and is, his own independent view 
that the clause permits class arbitration. The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly rejected 
petitioner's argument that this Court's mandate implicitly required the state high court to vacate 
the arbitral awards and lower court judgments confirming them. The petition for an extraordinary 
writ of mandamus is wholly baseless and should be denied. 
Petitioner's liability for violating the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code has been 
conclusively determined in arbitration. The arbitrator has now repeatedly held that the governing 
arbitration clause permits class arbitration. Petitioner fails to establish any of the exceptional 
grounds for *11 issuance of a writ of mandamus. Such a writ would amount to this Court taking 
the exceptional and unwarranted step of intruding into South Carolina's administration of its own 
courts, even before the state court proceedings are complete. Petitioner seeks mandamus, not to 
assure compliance with this Court's decision, but rather to upset a conclusive judgment against it 
so that it might contend that reinstatement of the judgment is unsecured, and is thus virtually 
nullified due to petitioner's bankruptcy liquidation. Even if petitioner were successful in obtaining 
vacatur, the arbitrator's decision would compel its immediate reinstatement, with the only 
difference being that petitioner would then argue that the reinstated judgment would be “new,” 
unsecured, and more recent for purposes of calculating post-judgment interest. The writ should 
not be used to manipulate the formalities of state court procedure and undermine the substance 
of respondents' recovery, but should instead be denied. 
I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF MANDAMUS. 
Petitioner has shown no circumstances-let alone the “clear and indisputable” grounds-warranting 
mandamus. Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 
394, 403 (1976). “Because mandamus has ‘the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a 
litigant,’ the Court has stressed that it should be ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’ ” 
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 538 (1984), quoting, Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260, (1947). 
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy only available when a petitioner demonstrates a 
threat of irreparable injury. Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 933 (1981). A party seeking 
issuance of a writ of mandamus must show that the grounds are “exceptional,” his right to the 
writ *12 is “indisputable,” and that he has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he 
desires.” Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403; Sup. Ct. R. 20.1. 
Petitioner is not threatened with irreparable injury or any other extraordinary circumstance that 
could justify mandamus. Petitioner contends that the South Carolina Supreme Court failed to 
execute the mandate of this Court insofar as it did not vacate the awards of the arbitrator or the 
state trial courts' judgments confirming them. Pet. 2. The state court's action complied with the 
mandate and is fully in accord with state law. The mandate sought only to discover whether the 
arbitrator had acted independently in reading the arbitration clause to permit class arbitration 
and, if he had not to discover his independent view. The South Carolina Supreme Court, 
following full briefing on the state procedural questions, correctly carried out the mandate when 
it remitted the issue to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator's view is now clear. 
To be entitled to mandamus, a party must establish that a clear and indisputable right is 
threatened by the lower court. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 
289 (1988). If the mandate or judgment of the Supreme Court leaves a question open for the 
exercise of discretion by the lower court, the decision of the latter cannot be reversed by 
mandamus. In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 256 (1895); In re Potts, 166 U.S. 263, 
265-266 (1897); Ex Parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U.S. 317, 319 (1900). Petitioner cites to no 
rule of law, procedure or statute that clearly and undisputably establishes its right, or this 
Court's authority, to direct the procedures by which the South Carolina Supreme Court remitted 
the state law contract interpretation question to the arbitrator. 
The state high court's decision to return the matter directly to the arbitrator is a matter of state 
procedural law and judicial discretion. Petitioner unsuccessfully made the same *13 argument to 
the South Carolina Supreme Court that it asserts here-that this Court's mandate not only 
vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court's order affirming the final arbitration awards, but that 
it also implicitly vacated the arbitral awards and the lower courts' judgments entering them as 
final orders. The state high court correctly rejected that contention. 
Petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus is nothing more than an attempt to involve this Court 
in micro-managing the South Carolina Supreme Court's administration of the state court system. 
“This Court repeatedly has recognized that States have important interests in administering 
certain .aspects of their judicial systems.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-13 
(1987). This Court properly declined to interject itself into the state judicial process when it 
issued the mandate in this case. In this case, this Court gave no specific instructions to the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, other than to obtain a clear determination from the 
arbitrator.[FN6] The South Carolina Supreme Court, in turn, returned the matter to the arbitrator 
without interfering or attempting to interfere with the arbitral process. The absence in this 
Court's mandate of any direction to the state high court to vacate the underlying judgments is 
dispositive here. 
FN6. Compare, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 
(1999)(vacating a judgment of the Ninth Circuit, remanding and instructing the Ninth Circuit to 
vacate the judgment of the District Court.). 
The essence of the relief petitioner seeks is to (1) vacate the existing judgments; (2) require 
respondents to obtain a judgment that might be interpreted as “new,” and thus arguably 
unsecured by the existing bonds and/or unable to support the accrued post-judgment interest; 
and (3) thereby to eviscerate respondents' recovery. Nothing in the mandate requires the 
additional relief petitioner seeks, and such relief *14 would be antithetical to the actual result 
intended by the arbitrator and the state courts in this protracted litigation. 
General Atomic Co., v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493 (1978) (per curiam) on which petitioner principally 
relies, fails to support mandamus in this case. There, the Court had earlier enjoined the state 
court, on Supremacy Clause grounds, from preventing General Atomic from asserting federal 
claims in federal forums. When the state court repeated that error on remand from this Court, 
the Court, although declining to issue a formal writ of mandamus, again disapproved the state 
court's effort to bar proceedings appropriate to federal judicial or arbitral forums. There is no 
similar error here of any state court acting beyond its constitutional authority in contravention of 
an earlier mandate. Petitioner's reliance on United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 
(1950), is similarly misplaced. See Pet. 18. Munsingwear stands only for the proposition that a 
judgment may by eliminated in a moot case. If anything is moot in this case, it is petitioner's 
contention that the FAA or this Court's mandate are violated. Now that the arbitrator has more 
fully explained and reaffirmed the grounds for his original awards, there can be no dispute that 
petitioner has already obtained the contemplated enforcement of the arbitration clauses 
“according to their terms.” Pet. App. 12a; see Pet. 21 (acknowledging that further proceedings 
after petitioner's desired vacation of the judgment “might result in new judgments that 
potentially could be reconciled with the requirements of the FAA”). Neither the mandate, state 
law, nor the FAA requires more. 
II. THE PETITION IS PREMATURE AND SEEKS TO CIRCUMVENT THE ORDINARY APPELLATE 
PROCESS. 
The extraordinary writ of mandamus does not serve as a substitute for the ordinary appellate 
procedures. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-383 (1953); *15 Heckler 
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). Such writs are only to be used when, for some special 
reason, the appellate process does not provide an adequate remedy. Id. Petitioner's request for 
the issuance of a writ of mandamus is an apparent attempt to circumvent the normal appellate 
process. 
The state high court's order of February 20, 2004, was an order remanding the case to the 
arbitrator for further consideration consistent with this Court's opinion.[FN7] For the third time, the 
arbitrator has independently concluded that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. 
Petitioner has not yet appealed or otherwise challenged that ruling in the state system. If 
petitioner has a colorable complaint with regard to the arbitrator's decision, it should pursue it 
through the state court system. Were it to do so, it would be subject to the stringent limits on 
judicial review applicable to any decision issued in binding arbitration. See Pittman Mortgage 
Company v. Edwards, 327 S.C. 72, 76-77 (1997); Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. 
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509-510 (2001). 
FN7. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard before the arbitrator, and, if it believed additional 
submissions were necessary, it could have submited a brief or proposed order to the arbitrator 
outlining its position. It reasonably did not do so, however, because it had nothing new to say. 
As the arbitrator pointed out in his Supplemental Order, “the question of whether the subject 
arbitration clauses allowed for class arbitration has already been fully briefed and argued by the 
parties in the proceedings before me. Thus, I find no need for an additional hearing in order to 
render the decision required by the United States Supreme Court.” Pet. App. 20a-21a. 
Petitioner's gratuitous innuendoes ( e.g. Pet. 9, 21, 23) that the arbitrator's decision not to hear 
further evidence was improper, or that the arbitrator is somehow non-neutral, are baseless at 
best. 
Petitioner instead comes to this Court with a spurious argument that a writ of mandamus must 
be issued, but mandamus cannot be employed to circumvent ordinary appellate procedures. The 
arbitrator has ruled and informed the South Carolina Supreme Court of his decision, but the *16 
South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet acted on the arbitrator's decision.[FN8] 
FN8. Petitioner has presented no evidence that the South Carolina Supreme Court has, or will, 
depart from the requirements of state law. State procedures delineate routes for obtaining 
clarification from trial courts or arbitrators without necessarily disturbing their judgments. Under 
its own rules, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court may require a report “of a trial, or 
of any matter relative thereto” from a trial judge (in this case, the arbitrator). SCACR Rule 
212(a). Such request for a report under Rule 212(a) does not require vacatur, but may, indeed, 
confirm the propriety of reaffirming an underlying judgment. 
To interfere with the South Carolina Supreme Court before it issues its final order in this case 
would interfere with the principles of federalism established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971). See Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 
432 (1982). When the South Carolina Courts complete their proceedings, the parties can take 
any appropriate steps, as needed, to protect their rights. No extraordinary relief can be required 
of this Court at this time. 
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT MANDAMUS 
Petitioner argues that because this Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision 
below, the FAA somehow requires vacation of the underlying arbitral awards and trial court 
judgments confirming them. This Court directed only that the South Carolina Supreme Court's 
opinion be vacated, and that further proceedings be held consistent with the Court's opinion. 
Nothing in the FAA, or in this Court's opinion or mandate, dictates how these proceedings be 
held. 
It is well established that parties may contract for state law procedures to govern their 
arbitration agreement, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland, 489 U.S. 
468, 477 (1989), and in this case, the parties chose the *17 law of South Carolina.[FN9] “Where, 
as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules 
according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the 
result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.” Volt, 
489 U.S. at 479.[FN10] The South Carolina Supreme Court is free to employ whatever procedure it 
deems appropriate to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate in this case, as long as it is 
consistent with the FAA's goals of not frustrating private arbitrations. Remanding this case to the 
arbitrator was fully consistent with state procedures and the FAA's policies promoting arbitration. 
FN9. Green Tree's adhesion contract provided: “You agree this contract will be governed by the 
law of the State of South Carolina.” R. App. 2162; see Pet. App. 13a (“the parties agreed that 
South Carolina law would govern their arbitration agreement”). 
FN10. The terms of Section 9 reinforce that principle, providing that “If the parties in their 
agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made 
pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then … any party to the arbitration may 
apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award.” In this case, the parties 
specified that “[j]udgments upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 6a. When Green Tree chose South Carolina state courts as a proper forum 
for post-arbitration proceedings, it subjected itself to the procedural rules and authority of that 
court system. Having received the benefit of its bargain-post arbitration procedures “in a court 
having jurisdiction”-Green Tree cannot now object to the procedures in the very court that it 
selected. 
Throughout its petition, petitioner repeatedly mischaracterizes the arbitration awards as having 
been entered in violation of the FAA, and this Court's decision as having so held. This Court 
made no such holding, nor could it have. To the contrary, its decision was premised on the 
recognition that an arbitrator's independent interpretation of an arbitration clause as permitting 
class arbitration fully accords with the FAA. Even the lack of clarity at the time of this Court's 
*18 plenary review as to whether the arbitrator's decision was independent did not thereby 
place the arbitrator's decision in conflict with the FAA. Now that the arbitrator has made 
unmistakably clear that he read the clause to permit class arbitration, there can be no doubt that 
the requirements of the FAA have been met. 
Furthermore, Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA, on which petitioner relies, do not govern state court 
proceedings; by their plain language, they apply only to federal courts. Section 9 provides for 
confirmation of arbitral awards by application “to the United States court in and for the district 
within which such award was made,” and Section 10 provides that, in specified, narrow 
circumstances, “the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may 
make an order vacating the award.” 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10. This Court has never held that Section 9 
and 10 apply to arbitrations of purely state-law, nondiversity claims such as the claims in this 
case. See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n. 10 (1984) (declining to hold that FAA Sections 
3 and 4 apply to state arbitrations).[FN11] 
FN11. Green Tree seeks to bootstrap itself into the coverage of Sections 9 and 10 by generally 
contending that the parties “agreement” is governed by the FAA. Pet. 22. The arbitration clause 
only states, however, that Section 1 of the FAA applies. Pet. Opp. 6a. Moreover, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court, in originally rejecting petitioner's challenges and affirming the award, 
never decided that Section 10 applied, but cited to both state and federal standards for approval 
of arbitration awards. 
 
*19 CONCLUSION 
 
The petition for a writ of mandamus should be denied. 
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